Behold I have set before you the Life and the good the Death and the bad - part two.

This is not really a part two so much as another observation that I would like to make about the mikrah in devarim . I think it is interesting to note the lashon of the verse, the pasuk does not say " behold I have set before you life and good death and bad" but rather it says " Behold I have set before you the life and the good , the death and the bad". Did you catch the difference? The verse describes these two choices as either THE life and THE good, or conversely THE death and The bad. The use of 'the' instead of just saying life and good, death and bad, seems to be a further pointer to the meaning of the verse. Rationality and intellectual living is THE Life that man was created for, it is THE GOOD. On the other hand the life of an animal is in reality THE Death of man and THE BAD, the worst possible engagement available to him.

I guess that was a simple point but perhaps it needed to be said again...

Behold I have set before you Life and the good and the Death and the bad and you shall choose life

"ראה נתתי לפניך היום, את החיים ואת הטוב, ואת המוות, ואת הרע" (דברים ל,טו
This mikrah often bothers me and this week it popped into my head again, what kind of a choice is that? . I have set before you life and good, death and bad, choose life?I have given you poison and I have given you sustenance pick whichever you prefer? It seems almost absurd that this mikrah is couched as a choice. What type of choice is it?
Bob, I have two things in my hand , one is a baseball bat with which I will beat you, the other is a pillow for you to rest on, now Bobbo, which one do you want? Curious, no?

Also this week I had an interesting conversation with a friend of mine , ( you know who you are),the friend was lamenting her recent removal from an environment of Torah where she was surrounded by chachmah and Tov.She was literally pained by the sudden uprooting from her cozy chachma nest and the dumping into the world outside the Beit Midrash.Indeed I had recently experienced a similar pain, ( in my case it was pre-emptive), at my impending limit of Beit Midrash time. I think however, that these two feelings , the pain at removal from being one of the permanent "Yoshevei beisecha", to a mere student or a worker, can be assuaged with a proper understanding of the pasuk of Chayim and Maveth, tov and rah.

I think that we can find an answer to my uneasiness with the "choice" in the mikrah if we recall the words of a certain chacham, who has often been quoted by other chachamim anonymously , but I will reference him by saying " hear the truth from whoever speaks it". The quote is as follows ,"EVERY art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim." To my mind this quote provides a very good solution, every action of man points to what that man holds to be good, clearly that is why man would do anything. If you did not perceive some good in what you were doing then you would not do it. Now if we keep this in mind then the verse could be saying, " behold I have set before you real Life and objective good and certain death and objective bad which you view as good because you have a false concept of the good, re-evaluate your idea of the good and choose the objective good". In other words this verse is a command to use your mind to decipher what is and is not good .

Now, how does this apply to the situation of my friend?

We are given minds to percieve the wisdom of the creator. This is the ultimate goal of Man. In the words of the pasuk we are given minds to " choose the good", the good is yediath Hashem.When we are in an environment of a beit midrash, when we are literally those who the psalmist speaks of in Psalm 145 as being praiseworthy, we feel a sense of security. It is almost as if we are in an intellectual summer camp, we are engaged in ideas, activities ,on our own, but we are also closed off and sheltered within the stacks of books. Our outside experiences, as in summer camp, are controlled, highly limited.Our learning is regulated, there are shiurim that we have given to us, our schedules revolve around certain fixed points of involvement in chachamah .As such when we are in the Beit Midrash what cares do we have? What is tosafot talking about? How can the Rambam say one thing here and seemingly contradict himself two paragraphs later, ( Lo aleinu!), or even the concern of one who is uncomfortable with the harsh criticism of the Ra'avad. But we do not have open exposure to influences and attractions that openly challenge us on the very deoth that we spend our time with.So the pain comes when we are ripped from this security and thrown into this brave new world of work and battalah and bills to pay and kids to feed and responsibility. No one is there to tell us to learn, no one is standing over our shoulder if we are mevattel our time, no rebbi next to you in shiur to guide you everyday, no chavrutha at work to help you be perfected.
This pain is however, great. Think about it, the pain is the confrontation between the world of bechirah and your mind. It is the point at which you must decide, " Jake, are you gonna go off and lose your mind , or are you going to grab tight and be an Adam".( You dont have to decide using the name Jake, but I do...).This is the first real exposure to the world of maveth and rah and the potential for chayim and tov. In this world of malacha , or better yet just the world outside, we are immediately confronted with taavoth and other distractions that challenge our conception of tov. The pain is beneficial at this point because it is the screaming of the soul, the mind or whatever you want to call it, the yelping of a mind that was spoiled by all day involvement in chachamah and is now conflicted over the removal or limitation of it.It is the recognition of what you have up until now held to be the good. This pain is what will in the beginning stages push you to the bechirah of tov and of chayim and will steer you from the pitfalls of rah and maveth.





א רשות כל אדם נתונה לו: אם רצה להטות עצמו לדרך טובה ולהיות צדיק, הרשות בידו; ואם רצה להטות עצמו לדרך רעה
ולהיות רשע, הרשות בידו. הוא שכתוב בתורה "הן האדם היה כאחד ממנו, לדעת, טוב ורע" (בראשית ג,כב)--כלומר הן מין זה של אדם היה אחד בעולם, ואין לו מין שני דומה לו בזה העניין, שיהא הוא מעצמו בדעתו ובמחשבתו יודע הטוב והרע ועושה כל מה שהוא חפץ, ואין לו מי שיעכב על ידו מלעשות הטוב או הרע. וכיון שכן הוא, "פן ישלח ידו" (שם

ה [ג] ועיקר זה עיקר גדול הוא, והוא עמוד התורה והמצוה--שנאמר "ראה נתתי לפניך היום, את החיים ואת הטוב, ואת המוות, ואת הרע" (דברים ל,טו), וכתוב "ראה, אנוכי נותן לפניכם--היום: ברכה, וקללה" (דברים יא,כו): כלומר שהרשות בידכם; וכל שיחפוץ האדם לעשות ממעשה בני האדם--עושה, בין טובים בין רעים. ומפני זה העניין נאמר "מי ייתן והיה לבבם זה להם" (דברים ה,כה)--כלומר שאין הבורא כופה בני האדם ולא גוזר עליהן לעשות טובה או רעה, אלא ליבם מסור להם

Ra'avad on teshuva 3:15 continued

As I stated in the previous post, it is more than clear that the Ra'avad held from a rational mesora . However, there is still the main question that I had raised which has yet to be answered. The question, in summation is, why would the Ra'avad use the phrase Gedolim vtuvim memenu to refer to those who believed in a physical G, if in fact he rejects that notion.


In the kesef mishna, Rav Yosef Karo takes up our question:
כתב הראב"ד "ולמה קרה לזה מין וכו' .המשבשות את הדעות עכ"ל.
ויש לתמוה על פה קדוש איך יקרא לאומרים שהוא בעל גוף ובעל תמונה גדולים וטובים ממנו . ואפשר שעיקר הנוסחא כמו שכתוב בספר העיקרים פ"ב ממ"א וז"ל. א"א אע"פ שעיקר האמונה כן הוא המאמין היותו גוף מצד תפיסתו לשונות הפסוקים והמדרשות כפשטן אין ראוי לקרותו מין .


"There is astonishment at the holy mouth [ the Ra'avad] how can he call those who say that G' ahs a body or image " greater and better than he"? It is possible that the essential textual version is the same as is written in the sefer haikkarim : "Abraham states, even though the essential conviction is thus ( that G' is non physical) , one who believes that G' has a body because of the language of the verses and the literal interpretation of the midrashim , it is not appropriate to call him a min."

I was recently made aware of a shiur given by my Rosh Yeshiva, Rav Y. Chait regarding contradictory beliefs in which he mentions this Ra'avad. The shiur can be accessed at http://www.ybt.org/Sunday03092003.ram.

The main point that I have gathered from the shiur regarding our Ra'avad is one which deserves a post in its own right.

The real question here is when we are confronted with language from chazal or other chachamim that semingly contradicts our Yisodos, what should our response be? Our Ra'avad is a prime example of this. Are we to view the problem language as a claim against our already established principles , or is there another reaction.According to Rabbi Chait the appropriate reaction to seemingly contradictory language in the corpus of Torah sheba'al peh is the reaction of the kesef mishna to the Ra'avad. The Kesef Mishna did not read the Ra'avad and question his yisodos. The reaction of Rav Yosef Karo was to utterly reject the problem language as invalid and suggest an appropriate replacement. The response to problem chazals is not to run away screaming that the Yisodos are uprooted because of whatever problem language appears. Rather, the response to a problem language is to clamly return to your knowledge of the foundational principles of yehaduth and to accept that the way in which you are understanding that language is impossible within the mesora and to simply reject the problem statement.This is not to say that you cannot try to resolve the problem, if there is a sevara that can preserve the language and is within the framework of Torah then congratulations you have fought a war in which the truth has prevailed. However, if you cannot salvage that particular language then be satisfied that you were able to determine a conflict between what you were reading and the Yisodos and know that the Yisodos are true and there is no statement that will shake you of that notion.

In conclusion, whenever we are faced with a seemingly problematic statement within the mesora there can be but one reaction. To retreat back to the sound foundations of yehaduth that have been rationally proven , and not put stock in languages that conflict with what we already know is true.

The Chazon Ish brain surgery, Rav Charlop and his "telekenisis" and other fantastic tales of bizui haTorah

I recently met a very intelligent fellow who told over two very fantastic "stories" regarding gedolim and seemingly miraculous events. This gent proceeded to question the rational philosophy espoused by my yeshiva based on these two fantastic stories.I had heard the first story many years ago and it remains unverified and without a source to this day. Recently I was informed ( although I have yet to see it myself) that this story is included in the biography of the Chazon Ish ( Harav Avrohom Yishaya Karelitz) which was published by a very prominent religious publishing house. The second story was new to me and I have been unable to find it anywhere. Again it is unverified and unsourced. I am writing this not in response to the stories themselves but rather as a reaction to the way people view these stories . I would like to preface by saying that this is in no way an attack on the individual who told me these stories. Indeed he was doing nothing less than seeking the truth and he should be commended for it.This is however, a response to the method of thinking that these stories are used to support.













(I will present the stories as I have heard them, If there are sources and or corrections in the story please make me aware of them.)






Story A- The Chazon Ish- brain surgeon.






The story goes as follows.






There was a patient in Israel who had a large brain tumor that required surgery of a very difficult nature in order to be cured. No surgeons were able to figure out exactly how to execute the surgery.The patient was distraught at the possibility that modern medicine could not save him and he sought guidance from the gaon Rav Avrahom Yeshaya Karelitz , the Chazon Ish. As the story goes the Chazon Ish examined the patient and using his knowledge of mesechet Chullin was able to plot the appropriate method for surgery.






Story B- Rav Charlop and his telekinetic abilities






The second story as told by this individual :






During the first World War Rav Charlop was mithpalel at the kotel. Suddenly he had a vision of Rav Avraham Yitzchak Hacohen Kook learning in London. ( Apparently Rav Kook was residing in England during the hostilities.) Not only did Rav Charlop envision Rav Kook learning but he was also aware of the sugya that he was learning at that very moment. Rav Charlop was purported to have told this to Rav Kook sometime later when they were reunited.











The problem I have with both of these stories is as follows. Let us assume that both stories are real. It is possible that the Chazon Ish was able to devise a way to remove a brain tumor. Rav Karelitz was a tremendous chacham and it is possible that he was aware of brain function and physiology enough to help the medical professionals. Perhaps. It could also be logically argued that the second story was a result of Rav Charlops tremendous understanding of the mind and thoughts or Rav Kook which led him to think of what Rav Kook was learning. Again, it is theoretically possible. My problem is thus: as I said it could be that both of these stories occured in some form, somehow. However, the emphasis and weight that is put into these stories along with the inevitable questioning of rationality that follows is the problem.





When these stories were told to me they were told in order to somehow prove to me that there are magical phenomena at work in the world. Miraculous occurences which somehow should call into question my world view. The purported surgery was a function of the fact that " everything is in the Torah" and so therefore a chacham will know science better than the scientist. ( I am still unclear as to exactly what the Rav Charlop story was supposed to prove).This is my problem. When we allow fantastical stories to creep into our minds and give them as much weight as rational investigation and mesora then we are degrading the very Torah which we claim to adhere to. I dont care one iota whether Rav Charlop knew what Rav Kook was learning or whether the Chazon Ish knew brain surgery. To the adherent of the mesora it is irrelevant.

There is another point that I am always astonished by aside from the sheer irrelevance to the mesora. These stories are nothing less than bizui haTorah and bizui talmidei chachamim. The fact that there are stories being told about chachmei hamesorah and their seemingly magical powers is defining what the mesora and chachamim are to the people who peddle these fables.In short, the mesorah( to those who adhere to these stories) is some magical tradition that allows those who master it to perform miracles and break the rules of science . In fact the mesorah is a rational worldview which accepts cause and effect as real and denies stupidity and foolishness. To imply that the Torah is a magic " realm" is to completly degrade the essence of the Torah. As the verse in Deuteronomy states(Chap.4 verse10)

וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם, וַעֲשִׂיתֶם--כִּי הִוא חָכְמַתְכֶם וּבִינַתְכֶם, לְעֵינֵי הָעַמִּים: אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁמְעוּן, אֵת כָּל-הַחֻקִּים הָאֵלֶּה, וְאָמְרוּ רַק עַם-חָכָם וְנָבוֹן, הַגּוֹי הַגָּדוֹל הַזֶּה
" and you shall guard them to perform them for they are your wisdom and understanding in they eyes of the nations that will hear all of these statutes and declare ' surely a wise and discerning and great nation this is".

The mesora and its masters are not magicians and anyone who implies the opposite should go ask one of them and they will instruct you to examine your actions and return to the system of reality.

Rav Abraham ben David of Posquieres and Hilchoth Teshuvah 3:15 ( 3:7)

משוך חסדך, ליודעיך; וצדקתך, לישרי לב
I often come in contact with people who claim that there is evidence to say that the belief in the physicality of G' is a valid position within the Mesorah. Often these people point to the hasagoth of the Ra'avad on the Mishneh Torah as evidence to their claims. Specifically the Ra'avad on Hilchoth Teshuvah chapter 3 halacha 15 (7) dealing with the classification of certain types of heretics.Fortunate are those who have the opportunity to learn from chachamim and know with utmost conviction that this is not so...

The Sources

Mishneh Torah Hilchoth Teshuvah chapter 3 halacha 15 ( 7):

טו [ז] חמישה הן הנקראין מינים: האומר שאין שם אלוה, ואין לעולם מנהיג; והאומר שיש שם מנהיג, אבל הם שניים או יתר; והאומר שיש שם ריבון אחד, אלא שהוא גוף ובעל תמונה; וכן האומר שאינו לבדו ראשון וצור לכול; וכן העובד אלוה זולתו, כדי להיות מליץ בינו ובין ריבון העולמים. כל אחד מחמישה אלו מין


"There are five who are called "Min": One who says that there is no G' and the world has no conductor, So too the one who says that there is a conductor but there are two or more, And one who says that there is one master but he has a body and image

Ra'avad
והואמר שיש שם רבון אהד אלא שהוא גוף ובעל תמונה. א"א ולמה קרא לזה מין וכמה גדולים וטובים ממנו הלכו בזו המחשבה לפי מה שראו במקראות ויותר ממה שראו בדברי האגדות המשבשות את הדעות

"one who says that there is a master but he has a body or an image. Abraham states: And why does he call this a min? How many people , greater and better than he went after this idea because of what they saw in the verses and the words of the aggadoth which cause mistakes in the deoth. "
The Questions
This Ra'avad clearly poses some problems.Firstly, what is the Ra'avad's use of " how many people greater and better than he". If as I am supposing, the Ra'avad really agrees with the Rambam then how can someone who has a false notion of G' be called greater than the Rambam who held the correct notion?In addition the shitta itself has to be understood.The proponents of the argument that the Ra'avad disagreed with the real idea of yichudo can merely point to the fact that those who do hold by a physical G are seemingly doing nothing wrong according to the language of this Ra'avad .I think that this is the crux of the argument to say that in reality the Ra'avad would ( G' forbid) tolerate the concept of a physical G'.

The response

I would be the first to agree that this is something that must be answered. Could it really be that one of the chachmei haMesorah maintains this? I have two points from which I will attack this problem. The first is within the Ra'avad himself, from his own language that he uses in this halacha. The second also the Ra'avad himself , but this time it is in what he does not say.

If you are familiar with the Ra'avad and his critiques of the Mishneh Torah , you know that if he disagrees with something he will be more than open in saying so. This is true to the extent that sometimes it appears as if the Ra'avad is harshly attacking the Rambam. In truth this is merely his way of emphasizing the problem as he sees it. It is from this awareness of the Ra'avad that a very compelling answer to our probem appears.

As I just stated the style of the Ra'avad in the Hasagot al Mishneh Torah, is not to sit quietly if he disagrees with what the gedolei hamechabrim is saying. The Rambam did not scare the Ra'avad into submission. So it is clear to me that we can deduce a simple rule about the Ra'avad. If he does not mention any criticism then it must mean that he agrees with the Rambam . If we keep this in mind then all we have to do to prove that not only did the Ra'avad not disagree with the idea of yichudo brought down in the Mishneh Torah but in fact he agreed fully, is look at Yisodei haTorah. This is the section that the Rambam has of the fundamentals of yehaduth. Included in these perakim is the concept of Yichud hashem, Yirah, Ahava and Yedias hashem. If there was ever a time to voice your opposition to those concepts as championed by Maimonides , it is in this section. Yet we find something very curious. There is not a single word from the Ra'avad on any thing until the sixth chapter of Yisodei haTorah , which is already passed the topics of metaphysics and Physics. So the Ra'avad has admitted his position through silence.

Furthermore, if one were to reject my assumed principle that silence for the Ra'avad is an admission of agreement, then we have but to look at the words that he does say. Let us now take a closer look at the words of ,the Ilan Gadol,Rabbi Abraham Ben David of Posquieres .

והואמר שיש שם רבון אהד אלא שהוא גוף ובעל תמונה. א"א ולמה קרא לזה מין וכמה גדולים וטובים ממנו הלכו בזו המחשבה לפי מה שראו במקראות ויותר ממה שראו בדברי האגדות המשבשות את הדעות
First off , the Ra'avad states that these unfortunates only hold this notion because of what they have read in the verses of Tanach. This could make the argument stronger after all if the tanach has anthropomorphisms then perhaps that is a valid idea.However, if you look at the last three words , I believe the entire argument crumbles like the bones of the wicked.These three are, " hameshabshoth et hadeoth" which means roughly " that confuse the ideational principles".This is the Ra'avad himself telling us that it is true

If the Ra'avad maintained as some would fancy, then there is no logical explanation for the use of " hamishabshoth et hadeoth". If the correct idea was the physicality of G according to the Ra'avad then why on earth would he mention that these notions are arrived at through pesukim and aggadoth which end up being meshabesh people's ideas.

It is interesting to note one other thing which can be learned from this hasagah of the Ra'avad. Not only do the last three words reveal the Ra'avads true thoughts on the subject, they also reveal at least in part , his concept of the aggadoth. The use of meshabesh hadeoth implies that the Ra'avad understood the system of aggadoth as something which must be rationally understood in order for it to benefit ones deoth. ( see essay on Aggadoth by Rabbeinu Abraham ibn Harambam)